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「ヨーロッパにおける権利濫用Jの
掲載にあたって(紹介と要約)
I 
1995年 10Fl 12日，南山大学ヨーロッパ研究センター主fli.南山大学法学会
協賛でJM:演会が調態された。以下の英文の論文{ふち:者がその際用意された講演
原稿に若干加さををされたものであるつ著者自身が第一次的{こは講演原稿であり
introductoryなものと考えておられるにもかかわらず質量ともに本務的論文とし
ての体裁をト分鍛えたものであること，内容が専門分野を関わず広く翻心を抱く
ことのできるテーマを素材としており，また臼本法をも素材としているため英文
ではあっても比1絞的容易に読み進めること，講演当日{立法体系の違いを趨えて共
通する問題として参加者との関で、活発な袈疑が行われ好評な講演会で、あったこと
などから，今部著者の御了解をいただいたうえ法学会の御厚意により，全文をそ
のまま掲載させていただくこととした。
著者であるウンベルトーイゴール A.ストラミニョーニ(じmberto匂orA. Strami・
gnoni)氏'i.1963王子生まれのイタリア国籍で，ローマ臨!漂白出大学(L.U.I.S.S.
(Rome)) を卒業後弁護士となり，その後コーネ}I..-大学大学院，オックスフォード
大学大学院を経て，オックスフォード大学で侍士号を取得し，現:t:E.ロンドン大
学 LSE (London School of Economics and Political Science)の法学部 (LawDepartment) 
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でヨーロッパ私法担当議陣をされている新進気鋭の比較法学者で、ある 2 私がオッ
クスフォード大学へ留学中におJiいの学際的関心から級交を結び，その縁で
1995年秋に共間研究の打ち合わせのために来日された ν その機会;こ前述の講演
会が際位されたわけである。
氏の関心;え比較法学者らしく，幅広い知識と 支えられてきわめて
多岐にわたるが.一貫して追求されているのは， i和、歴史観を前提として，
理論の形成，発展予 Z晃代的変容を的総に捉え，現代における基礎環論の再構築を
L功五;こしてはかるかという点、である。とりわけ，法学における永遠の課題であ
る，法的正当化問題における Formalityと SubstantialityないしおrmalReason-
lngと SubstantialReasoningの相互関係の理論的解明に関心を抱かれており，今
屈の議演テーマであったヨーロッパにおける権利濫用法潔の展開も、ヨーロッパ
の事情の簡単な紹介という制約のやでではあるが.両者の調整現主主としての役割j
の見直しという観点で捉えられている。
n 
論文;ふ fヨーロッパにおける権利諮問(院本法の禁干の検討をふまえて)Jと題
するものであり 5章構成から成っている c gJ、下では，その内容を婆約して紹介
しておくこととする
第 1宝章:一段的な三段論法
L 世界の国の法体系は，その隠の正義絞念.経世ミ，法解釈のスタイル・方
法.外器法の影響、実質的な意味での法.生産手段の公的・私的役禁，人様など
に応じて，いわゆる f法家絞jという概念で分類されている。このような分類方
法には磁々の批判があるが.本稿の観点からは一定の意味がある c
2. 法家族には，いわゆる「大陸法jと「コモン・ロ-Jがある c それにはそ
れぞれの歴史があるが，ヰミ穏では次の二点だけを指摘しておくコ (a)この
;ふヨーロッパ以外:こも及ぶ。たとえば日本法;之.大糧法家族;ニ属し，オースト
ラリアはコモン・ロ一家族;こ属している。 (b)雨室長族i，r法体系jであるという
点で共通しており，その特徴:丈高度の形式性 (formalityうであるご形式殺は，
路実性を提供し，状況の遠いにもかかわらず間総の取り扱いがなされるというこ
と，すなわち正義を保障する。
3. 以上のことから.次のような三段論法が成り立つ。すなわち，形式性は確
実性を導く。確実性;立正義を導く c それゆえ.形式住は正義を導く，とさしか
し，この論法は常に正しいとはいえない 3 形式性はーニュートラ jしな存在であ
(2) 
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り，正しいとか正しくないとかいうものではないc すなわち.どのような法怒る
形式的で、あるがゆえに正しい噌ということはできないc どのような法理でも，状
況によっては.それが尽指したのとは正反対の「不当な結果」を生じうる c これ
が「形式牲の問題jであり，法獲がこのように者夜的に不当な結采を導く可能性
があるj夕、上.これに対応で、きるような理論を備えておかなければ、ならない。以下
では，このような問題に対するヨーロッパの法体系におけるひとつの解答例を述
べる c
第2章:5.去の綬界領域で(権利滋用)
4，大判昭和 mm5民築 1，1考会 1965寅(宇奈月滋泉事{千人安濃津地判大正
15，8，10 法律新開 2648号 llR、(1ilia;兵務続事件)，火判昭和 lL7，口氏築 15巻
1481頁(発電照トンネ}"，事件)，大平日昭手o13，10，26民Ud7さき 2057哀(高知鉄道敷
設事件)，最判昭和 38.5.24民集 17巻 5号 639頁(対抗力のない土地変借入{こ対する
Hflj愛読求事件)を紹介ご
5. 以上の判例は，奴存の法JAが場合によっては不当な結果を導くことを示し
ている。ここで問題となる法理は.所有権絶対の概念である。たしかに，所有者
は自己の財産を自由に使用処分できるが，所有権の行使によって他人:ニ損害を与
えることまで許されるべきではない。他人の福祉に対する f攻撃jは.所有権の
行使として許されず.排除される ο これが伝統的な権利濫用の理論である。権利
;!設lfIは，どtEl ，複々のJ1Jf訴でfljJ題となる τ 権利滋)fl照念の主旨は，当該行為は
はないが.あまりにも合法的すぎるjという点にある(a)主観的要件
としては.r拐容を与える?JU支IJをあげるのが伝統的な理解である。 (b)客観的
要件は，当該行為によって他人:こ絞済的1JH1~ を 1チえるということである。このよ
うな権利読出は.他人を三与する窓I~でのみなされた訴訟提起のような場活lで、も認
められる。ヨーロッパ連合では，立法や千IJf9lJで権利;監掃に対する言及が見られる
が，どのような場合:こ権利ilf.imになるかは各IEJの立法のIgJ;:援である
6. 権利灘間について，日本民法典は模範的なf9lJである c 民法 l条3墳に規定
されている権利濫用の禁止は，一見するといかなる均会にも適if:Jされるように見
えるが，実際にはいくつかの点で限定がある c すなわち司政委博士によれば.ffi
手IJi監悶は. t言殺f!せとi豆別され，権利i監用をする者とされる者とのI1lJiこ特定の法律
龍係がない場合にのみ適用される。また.内在的;こは，主観的号室件と客観的要件
とによって限定されている。他方で.実際:こ権利i!，iJtlが利用されている事例は数
多いc 第二次大戦後の裁判例を見ると，全体で、三千件近くの lî~i11二が権利器用に関
係し.そのうち千件泣くが権利濫用と信義則違疫の両者;こ，また三百件余りが権
利滋悶と公序良{谷違反の隠者ーにまたがって関係している c
(3 ) 
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第3霊堂:大陸i去の菜て
7. ローマ法が所有権の行使には制限があるということを認めていたかについ
ては，議論がある。ディゲスタ (Digesla)にはこれを認めるような偲所もある
が，今Bではそれがローマ法の権利濫用とは克られていないc 権利i器用{えその
後の注釈さ詳派と後期注釈学派の所産であると考えられており，フランス， ドイ
ツ，イタリアでは継受の程度は異なれ，いず、れも権利i監沼浬論を持っている。フ
ランスでは，ナポレオン法!!l!制定当時には，所有権の絶対性を強調するイデオロ
ギーの影響で権利滋悶の規定がなかったが，その後の判例や 1930王子代にジョス
ラン (LouisJ osserand)の著作によって今日では権利濫麻理論を認めるに至ってい
る。
8. ジョスランの理論は， ヨーロッパに大きな影響を及{ました。 ドイツでは，
ドイツ弐法226条にシカーネの禁止が規定されているが，これに眼らず， 826条
では良俗逮夜が， 242条では信義則が規定されており.広い意味で権利濫用に該
当するf易会をカヴァーしている。
9. イタリアでは， 1942if民法833条が，所有者lこ対して他人に扱答を与える
こと以外の8的を持たない行為を禁じており，民事訴訟法96条が，不当な訴訟
提起に対して損害賠償が認められることを規定している。さらに，民法2043条，
1175条， 1337条， 1366条， 1375条， 1460条の 2，2598条3項などによって，
ドイツにおけるのと問様に.広い意味での権利濫用を規制している。すなわち，
(a)所有権の濫用はひんぱんに発生する， (b)当事者関に一定の契約関係ないし
それに準じる関係があるときは，信義則に関する規定が権利の濫用を閉止する，
(c)濫婦により損害が生じたときは，領容賠償が認められうる， (d)以上以外の
場合であっても，扱答を与えることだけを民的とする所有権の行伎は，権利濫用
ないし，より一般的に非道徳的であるとされるのである。
第4寧コモン・ローの笑託主義
10.イングランド法は権利のi境問を阻止する一般的な原則を認めていないと解
されている c しかし，権利器用という言葉を伎わないだけで，実掠には権利i藍周
の場合を扱う理論を持っていたと考えられる。
1. 1989年にイングランドでは土地売安契約に関して改革があった。この改
革のひとつのポイントは，衡平法上の f一部n宣行の理論J(lhe dOClrine of part-
performance) を排除することにあった。この理論i;t.， 1681王子のある判決で認めら
れて以来，数t立紀を経て，修正されつつ 1989王子までは生き延びていたものであ
り.権利の濫用に関する重要な一場合であったと考えられる。
12. 1677年の詐欺及び偽証法 (lheStalule of Frauds and Perjuries)の4条では，
(4) 
Abuse of Rights in Europe: An Outline 192 
一定の契約は文書で締結されなければならず，当事者により署名されなければな
らないと規定されていた。これは，実在しない契約を存在すると主張する詐欺的
な者を排除するために設けられたものである。しかし，制定後は逆に，契約の一
部がすでに履行されているような場合でありながら，当該契約が必要な形式を備
えていないことを主張して，実際には存在する契約から逃れようとするケースが
出てきた。そこで，このような詐欺的な主張を排除するために一部履行の理論が
案出されたのである。私の考えでは，これはイングランドにおいて権利濫用を規
定していた一事例といってよL、。しかし， 1989王子に英田議会はその廃止を決定
してしまったので、ある。
13. -1ングランドには，フランス， ドイツ，イタリアのような権利濫尽に関す
る一般原則はない。しかし，一部臆行の理論がその一場合を扱っていた。権利濫
用は通常考えているよりも頻繁に生じる。前述した包本の裁判例はそのことを示
している。それゆえ，一部履行の理論の機能は，このような観点から再検討され
る必要があろう。
第5霊童:むすび
14. コモン・ローと大陸法は，法系の遣いにもかかわらず，形式性という共通
性を有している。形式性に関しては，形式性が正義を保障するという意見と，形
式性は正義を貫徹するための障害であるという意見とがある。前者は，法理を形
式的に適用することが裁判所の任務であるとして，個々の事件が提起する新たな
問題の解決を政治的な機関に委ねる。これに対して，後者は，形式性を排除し
て，裁判所は当該問題を解決するために実費的な探求をすべきであるという。し
かし，いずれかの立場のみを強調しまた批判することは妥当ではない。形式性そ
れ自体はニュートラルな実在であり，出発点にすぎない。また，裁判官に完全に
自由な裁量権を与えるべきでもない。権利滋用は これらの調整のための適切な
手段なのである。大陸法もコモン・ローも古い権利i登用概念を排除しているよう
に毘えるが，それに代わる適切な権利滋用論を確立しているとはいえない。新た
な権利濫用論のためのひとつの可能性としては，権利行使により「どのような危
答が加えられるか」という基準に代わって，権利行使により fどのような利益が
損なわれるかJという基準をたてることが考えられる。このような基準によれ
ば， r損害を与える意闘jを立証する必要もない。他方，擦なわれる利益は，経
済的に見て十分保護に値するものでなければならないことになろう。そして，権
利行使が経済的に評価できる利主主を生み出さず，または擦なわれる利益と比較に
ならないほど小さいものであるときは，権利の濫用であるとされることになろ
っ。
(5) 
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15.以上述べてきたことは，最終的な提案ではなく，今後の議論を晩起するた
めのものである。この問題を通じて，より効果的な法制度を確立するために努力
する価値はあるように思われる。
III 
権利灘間法理の独り歩きに対する危僚と明確な適用基準磁立の必要性について
は，わが国でも従来からかなり研究されていることろである。とりわけ客観的事
情の利益衡震に過度に依存することに対しては，むしろ「権利謹用のiEt用Jの危
険が指摘され，主観的事'清との総合判断の必要性や，よりきめ細かな類型化の必
要性が唱えられており，氏の問題提起はそれ自体白新しいものというわけではな
い。また，法的正当化の過程で Formalityと Substantialityの合理的な調整が重
要であるということについても，わが国ではこの調整が法規解釈という作業の中
で延々と行われているわけであり，それ自体当然のことである。このような意味
では，この論文は，内容的には権利諮問lこ関するヨーロッパ法の燈史と現状につ
いてのまさに introductoryなものにすぎない。
しかし，他方では，わが留でもこれまでイングランドに特有の理論と捉えられ
てきた一部履行の理論について新たな視点を提供し，法体系の遠いゃある法理，
法制度の遣いないしそれらの発獲の遣いを超えて，ある菌{こ特有の法理，法制
度，法現象と考えられているものについても Formalityと Substanti昌弘tyの調整
という観点からする栂関的なメルクマ-)1.--を新たに見出せば効薬的な研究が可能
であることを示すなど，比較法研究をするに捺して示唆的な点もまた多いように
盟、われる。それは，制度や埋論の表面的な類似性の有無にとらわれない開題状況
の把握の仕方と，比較をする際にいかに柔軟で相対的な視点、を持てるかという基
準の設定の仕方とにかかっていると主張されているのではなかろうか。
(文焚:中金交樹)
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Abuse of Rights in Europe: 
An Outline 
(With Some Observαtions on Modem J却問巴seLazよ)) 
By 
Umberto-Igor A. Straロugnoni1 
(i) A Commonly Accepted Syllogism 
1. Western students of comparative private law often place the vari-
ous countries of this world within so called“legal families".“Legal 
families" are the result of conventional classifications that compara鴨
tists made to convey the fundamental features of the various responses 
that the different countries give to matters that， from a Western point 
of view， fal within the domain of“the law". The notion of several 
such “families" is said to be justified， for exampleコbythe prevailing 
1 Lecturer in European Private Law at the London School of Economics 
and Political Science. The paper constitutes the text of the lecture held at the 
Centre for European Studies at Nanzan University， Japan， on October 12， 1995. 
The author wishes to thank the Director of the Centre， the Dean of the Law Fac-
ulty， and especially Professor H. Nakaya for the opportunity to visit 
(7) 
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conception of justice specific to the countries considered，z or by their 
common historical background，3 or by reference to style，4 methods 
of legal interpretation，5 influences exerted by outward legal ideas/ 
substantive rather than formal aspects of the law/ public or private 
nature oftheir means ofproduction，8 and even race.9 
One drawback of such classifications is that， generally， they mir“ 
ror the specific environment of those who make them-so that they 
may hardly have an independent value. Another drawback is that 
they are one-dimensiona1.10 A third drawback is that they are hardly 
exhaustive. So， for example， South幽Africashows distinctive cross幽
ways features that make it difficult to place it anywhere among the 
commonly accepted families. A fourth drawback is that， attimes， 
the classifications proposed are simply inadequate. So， for exam-
ple， Sauser-Hall in 1913 purported the existence-among others-
of a family of“peuples barbares" (barbarian people)戸
Nevertheless， some of the classifications proposed make sense 
(within ever increasing limits)， and can be used for present purposes. 
2 R. DavidラLesgra刀dssy灯台mesde droit contemporains (11 thed， Dalloz， 1988)， 
at 23. 
3 G. Gorla， Diritto comparato e Diritto Comune Europeo (1981)， at10 f. 
4 K. Zweigert -H. Kotz， Einfuhrung in die Rechtsvergleichungαuf dem Ge-
biete des Priむαtrechts，Tubingen， at72 f. 
5 T. Ascareli， Studi di dirito comparato e intemαdi intelpretazione (Milano， 
1952)， atXXXIX-XLII. 
6 E. Martinez-Paz， Jntroduccion al estudio del derecho ciむilcomparado (Cor-
doba， 1934)， at149 f. 
7 P. Arminjon輪B.Nolde制 M.Wolff，刀'aitede droit compare (Paris， 1950)， 
at 42-53. 
S G. Eorsi， Comparative Civil (Private) Law-Law号'pes，Law Groups， the 
Roads of Legal Development (Budapest， 1979)， at62-99. 
9 G. Sauser-Hal， forexample， pointed toピracearyenne ou indo-europeenne'， 
a group of‘races semitiques'， and a group of‘races mongoles' (Fonction et methode 
du droit compare， Geneve， 1913， at102-103). On juridical ethnology， se Mazza-
rela，ゴcaraterimorfologici' etc 
10 Zweigert and Kotz， Einfuhnmg etc， at68. 
11 So， according to Sauser-Hall，‘alors que dans ces trois premiers groupe-
ments rentreront tout les droits des peuples civilises， lequatriとmene compren-
dra que les droits des peuples barbares， droits essentiellement coutumiers， dont 
les points de contact sont nombreux et proviennent simplement d'un fond humani-
taire commun; tels sont les usages negritiens， melanesiens， indonesiens， australiens， 
polynesiens， ainsi que ceux des indigとnesde l' Amerique et des Hyperboreens' 
(Fonction et methode etc， at103-104). 
(8) 
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2. Since the formation in Europe of the modern nation states on 
the ruins of the Empire， pre-reformation Christianity， and its com欄
mon legal culture (jus commune)， the intellectual debate initiated 
by lawyers in occasion of the 1804 French codification， and revived 
with the German codification at the turn of the centu巧T，has some-
what dominated the Universities. The English and U.S. legal systems 
(with the exception of Louisiana) had remained outside what Savigny 
called the ‘cancer' of codification，12 and this is probably one reason 
why many comparatists have since long focused their attention on 
the so called“Civil Law" (the French and the Romano-Germanic 
codified sub-traditions)， and the so called“Common Law" (the Anglo-
American uncodified tradition). There is no need here to expand 
on what are commonly regarded to be the specific features of the 
two families in argument， nor on the differences and similarities 
between them. Suffice to make only the two following points. (a) 
The Civil Law family and the Common Law family do not include 
only European countries， but reach out to embrace other important 
communities of this world. So， forexampleコinmany ways J a pan can 
be regarded as a full-member of the Civil Law family-just as the 
Australian Federation is commonly said to belong to the Common 
Law family. (b) Both the Civil Law and the Common Law family 
include countries which have generated “legal systems"一一自白thatis， a
succession of rules which especially form the law. It is in the na幽
ture of such systems to be characterised by a high degree of for-
mality. Legal rules are formally identifiedうformallyapplied， and 
formally abolished. The interesting and complex works of scholars 
like， for example， Professors Neil MacCormidむRonaldDworkin， 
Morton Horwitz， Joseph Raz， Robert Summers， and Patrick Atiyah， 
provide a fresh look on certain aspects of this long-standing theme. 
If formality seems thus to be unavoidable， also there appears to be 
hardly any doubt that the degree and marks that formality can attain 
in any given legal system are substantially determined by cultural and 
historical incidents. One seemingly obvious reason for insisting on 
12 F. von Savigny，‘Of the Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and Juris-
prudence'， trans by A. Hayward， London， 1831， at 19 
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keeping a certain minimum degree of formality is that (inter alia) 
formality fosters certαznぴ-andsome degree of certainty， today， is
thus regarded as a fundamental common feature of countries in the 
Civil Law and in the Common Law tradition. By and large， cer-
tainty means the predictability of the outcome from the viewpoint 
of the law-in other words， the promise to equals of an equal treat-
ment in identical， similaむorcomparable circumstances. Such is 
the promise of justice. 
3. The terms of what could be therefore described as an often ac-
cepted syllogism， go as follows: formality leads to certainty; cer-
tainty leads to justice; therefore， formality leads to justice. But is 
this syllogism always true? Can one really say that formality leads 
to justice? 
This is of course a very complex matter. 1 think， however， that 
one can safely say that-per se-formality has a merely neutral struc峰
山re.Formality， assuch， is not good or bad， just or unjust， desirable 
or undesirable. That is， justness (or unjustness) is hardly an intrin-
sic quality of formality-ratheむformalityis an instrinsic quality 
of the (good or bad， just or unjust， desirable or undesirable) rule， or
system of rules， which form， orinform， each particular legal system. 
1n other words， while al good (and bad) rules are formal， no for“ 
mal rule is good (or bad) becαuse formal. 13 
A bad rule leads to injustice， and everγone of course under-
stands that such rules should be e1iminated. Good rules， by con-
trast， are meant to be kept. But how do we define a good rule? Is a 
substαutialZy good rule (sa弘 arule which works in nine cases out of 
ten) a good rule? A number of people would say yes. Others would say 
no.τhe point here is that the operative consequences of the two posi-
tions can be quite different. The first group of people will offer their 
sympathy to the minority aggrieved by the occasional hardship of 
the “substantially good" rule-but nothing more. The second group 
of people (the one that rejects quantitative arguments legitimising 
13 This is so a fortiori if one takes the view that legal rules are themselves 
neither good nor bad-they just rules. 
(10) 
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substantially good rules) will not be content until a solution for the 
minority cases is found. 
In general， one can say then that justice is achieved by read-
dressing perceived anomalies in a particular society through the crea-
tion of a certain ruleョorsystem of rules， apt to do the job. To the 
extent that such a rule， orsystem of rulesョisformally identifieι 
formally applied， and (when the case) formally abolished， formality 
can be said to lead to (better， foster) justice. But， the critical point 
here is that， even when justice is so achievedラitis sometimes the 
ve可 presenceof that particular rule， orsystem of rules， that might 
(on occasion) determine an unjust result. By “unjust result" 1 mean 
an outcome irreconcilable with the reasons for which the rule or the 
system under scrutiny was initially devised. 
The possibility of an unjust result visualises the “problem" of 
formality. The presence (rather than the absence) of a certain rule， 
or system of rules， is now at stake. That rule， orsystem of rules， is
now found to generate occasional injustice-一-anda substantial degree 
of formality in the identification and in the application of that rule， 
or system of rules， may thus reaffirm or even enhance the potenti幽
ality of injustice discovered in such rule， orsystem of rules (onl弘
that isフasfar as that particular case is concerned). Precisely be冊
cause the substance of formality is neutralラthiscan be coloured of 
justness or unjustness as the case may be.14 Then， again， one could 
adopt the view that legal systems do not have to provide justice a1 
the time-but only in a majority of cases. In other words， legal sys-
tems are only concerned with the application of the existing rules 
in the best possible way-and their relative justness in particular 
cases is a necessary evil to avert which one's formal approach to law 
cannot be sacrificed. Or one could take the rather different view that 
legal systems should (at leastフattemptto) provide justice in each 
and eve巧Tcase-that is， itis not sufficient that the existing rules 
14 Thus， the negative connotation traditionally associated with the term 
‘formalitγ(and its offshoot) could be somewhat more convincingly explained 
with the diaphanous fabric of that word-rather than in terms of the traditional 
antithesis between substance and form. 
(11) 
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are applied in the best possible way， but it is indispensable that new 
rules are continually devised to deal with inゐui1thard cases left u任
addressed by the legal system as it is. Only if one adopts the first view， 
the “problem" of formality arises. If one adopts the second vie同 by
co出rast，the problem of formality ceases altogether to exist. 
The following introductory observations are concerned with one 
specific example whereby the problem of formality arises， and with 
the response given by some Western legal systems. Obvious con-
strains require that 1 do not discuss， for example， the otherwise 
veηT interesting experience of the law of the Scandinavian coun-
tries/5 or the experience formerly or presently said to belong to 
the Socialist family.戸 Instead，1 shall concentrate on the Civil Law 
and Common Law families-and， within them， on select members 
of those two families only. 
(i) At The Frontiers of the Law: Abuse of Rights 
4.17 In one famous J apanese case， plaintiff bought a piece of land 
knowing that defendant had laid a pipeline on that land without the 
authorisation of the original owne工Then，plaintiff sought to sell 
the land to the defendant for an irreasonable price. Upon the de-
fendant's refusal to buy the land at that priceフplaintiffwent on， 
and asked a court the removal of the pipe. The court found that the 
plaintiff's claim was abusive一民 infact， he was simply attempting 
to force the defendant to buy the land at an excessive price.18 
In another case， alandowner asked the owner of a near-by sana-
torium to buy his land at an unacceptable price. Upon the latter's 
15 S. ]orgensen，‘Abuse of rights according to Nordic law'， inL'abus de 
droit (Padova， 1979)， at195-209. 
16 For example， G.Eorsi， 'The Abuse of right in doctrine and court prac-
tice in Hungary'， inL'abus etc， at87-113 
17 In this parapraph， a number of text-book ]apanese cases on abuse of rights 
are brief1y mentioned. Al of them are discussed to a somewhat deeper extent (but 
in the French language) by Y. Noda and T. Nomura's 'L'abus du droit en droit 
prive japonais'， inL'abus etc， at283-301. 
18 Daishin'in， October 5， 1935 (MS XIV町1965)
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refusal to buy， the lanιowner erected a building that considerably aι 
fected the lights and aeration of the sanatorium. 1t was held that the 
erection of the building constituted abuse of rights， forthe land幽owner's
only task was to damage the owner of the sana tori um.19 
An a1together different case occurred when a state-owned elec-
tric company laid down a water-pipe in a piece of land belonging 
to someone who， then， asked the removal of the work. The request 
was rejected on grounds thatフifthe pipeline were removed， the re-
sulting detriment for the company， aswell as the public at large 
served by that pipeline， would be unjustifiably excessive.20 Simi-
larly， ina case whereby the defendant railway company without 
authorisation had loaded with soil and sand a certain site belong-
ing to the plaintiff so as to reinforce the grounds on which the railway 
was being builtフthejudge found the plaintiff's land to be both of 
no use and of no value， and considered that the removal of the work 
in argument (at the time of the lawsuitフthework had been com-
pleted) would severely imp呂irthe functioning of the railway， as
well as the interest of the population reached by that service. Ac“ 
cordingly， the judge rejected the plaintiff's claim as fundamen-
tally a busive. 21 
Finally， inanother important decision， the buyer of a piece of 
land asked the lessee of the land (who was also the owner of a house 
buiIt on that land) to leave the premises on grounds that the lessee had 
failed to comply with the formalities required by law when the house 
had been bui1t on the site. Because of the want of the required formali幽
ties， the lessee was unable to protect his position as against the buyer. 
Nevertheless， the Japanese Daishin'in found for the defendant-lessee， 
in consideration of the fact that the buyer had known of the exis-
tence of the leaseフandactively impeded the lessee from complying 
with the formalities in argument.22 
19 Chiho-Saibansho， AnotsuヲAugust10， 1926 (HS no. 2648-11). 
20 Daishin'in， July 17，1936 (MS XV-1481). 
21 Daishin'inヲOctober26，1938 (MS XVII-2057) 
ぷ Saiko-Saibansho， May 24，1963 (SSH civ.， XVII叩ふ639).
(13) 
5. Each one ofthe cases mentioned in the previous paragraph points 
to one instance whereby an existing rule may on occasion generate 
what looks like an unjust result.23 The rule in question is the norm 
conferring certain individuals proprietary rights over certain things. 
According to such ruleフtheindividuals concerned are entitled to 
transfer， use or dispose of their property as they best like. Further閑
more， they are entitled to protect their property both immediately， 
and through the intervention of a public official (or other relevant 
constitutional authority). This is， inessence， the Western notion 
of“absolute ownership". 
The degree of formality reached by so many European couか
tries， however， issuch that when the defendant has title over the 
thing， this is regarded to provide the judiciary with an exclusiolト
a巧Treason not to look at any underlying issue which might affect 
unduly the defendant's position as the owner of the thing.24 But， 
should those who are entitled to exercise proprietary rights over 
things， be allowed-in so doing-to affect negatively the interests 
of another person? That is， isabsolute ownership a right匂rg，αom-
nes'， oris it also a right (contrαomnes' ? Was the buyer of the land 
where the pipeline had been laid down (first case) not entitled to do 
with his property what he pleased-including removing the work 
(even considering that the only reason for doing this was to force 
the other to buy the land at an unacceptable price)? The dilemma 
could be cast in the following terms: while it is clear that the exer-
cise of one's own proprietary rights may well on occasion entail 
“offence" to another person's welfareフitwould also seem that one 
should not be allowed to exercise her proprietary rights over the 
thing with the only or prevailing objective to commit such “offence". 
This is the traditional concern of the doctrine known as “abuse of 
rights". Again， one's formal approach to the rule of law expressing 
23 But the holders of the first view discussed above， * 3，would probably 
consider it a necesaηr result. 
24 This proposition would require a number of quaIifications that cannot be 
made here-where I am only concerned with one particular aspect of the reIa仲
tionship existing between a certain rule (“ownership is absolute")， and its boun-
deries. 
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the idea that ownership is absolute， could-by contrast-preclude 
whatever consideration for the actual result of the owner's exercise of 
her proprietary rights over the thing. Indeed， this alternative ap-
proach would go as far as denying that there can be such a notion as 
the "abusive" exercise of an absolute “right". Either there is “rightぺ
or there is nothing.25 
The fundamental concern of the doctrine of abuse of rights ap-
pears to arise virtually everywhere in the law-though it is hardly 
ever acknowledged in so many words. So， for example， while 1 
have the right to drive my car， itis clear that 1 have no right to 
drive it as 1 like， and even less to run down my nosey neighbour. 
But the doctrine of abuse of rights is present elsewhere too-for 
example， within the domain of competition law， labour law， fam桐
ily law， etc. In other words， abuse simply defines whatever right 
(or prerog，αtives juridiques d析ηies26)by placing a firm limit to its 
exercise. Indeedフthedoctrine nowadays appears to be stil ques-
tioned only within select areas of the already limited realm of the 
private law (property and contracts). Hence， the cases mentioned 
above. 
The central point about what can be regarded as a Western 
notion of abuse of rights is that the offensive act in argument is 
not‘illegal， but . . . toolegal'.27 Important questions related to a rule 
oflaw signiかingthe (possible) rejection of a certain exercise of one's 
own proprietary rights as abusive (that is， assuming such rejection 
on the basis of the employment of the word “abuse" stronger in char聞
acter than， for example， "misuse") are the following: (a) what would 
be the subjective， and (b) what would be the objective requirements， 
of the "offensive" act.28 The answer to the first question appears to be 
deceptively simple. One traditional way to put it is that abuse of 
25 Below， note 28. 
26 J. Ghestin et G. Goubeaux， Tiトaitede Droit Civil-Introduction General， 
Paris (3me ed.， 1990)， at687. 
27 Allen， Law in the Making etc， at379. 
28 A third question is whether rights can be abused (planiol，ηαite elementaire 
de droit ciむil，H， no.871). A fourth question concems the diference between abuse of 
rights and the misuse of a liberty， and between abuse of rights and breach of a duty 
or an obligation 
(15) 
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rights obtains when one party exercises her right with a malicious 
motivation. Malice is often understood to be the ζintention to cause 
harm畑一一時thoughone could wonder to what kind of“harm" the inten幽
tion should be directed. However paradoxical this might seem， some 
people act with malice (i.eづ intentionto cause h註E田)ultimately to 
amuse， surprise， educate， deliver a certain message， or stimulate a 
response. Is that harm? If the answer is no， then one should proba崎
bly say that abuse obtains only when the intended harm is gratuitous. 
If the answer is yes， one should probably say that abuse obtains when 
one party intends to harm the other whatever the reason for this 
conduct might be claimed to be.30 
The next question arises， however， when is it that malice can 
be said to be serious enough to trigger the reaction of the legal sys-
tem. The general answer seems to be that malice is conclusively un-
lawful when it is clear that the exercise of the right in question would 
negatively affect someone else's (use of the) property in a way which 
can be meαsuγed in economic terms (objective requirement). So， abuse 
of rights obtains not every time one acts maliciously， but only when 
a damage measurable in economic terms can be shown.31 
Can abuse of rights obtain within the legal process? At least 
in theoηT， the answer is yes.32 In particular， the exercise of a legal 
action is the exercise of a power (qualified differently in different 
jurisdictions) deriving from， orassociated with， one or more rights-
and so is the exercise of the defence. The malice necessa巧Tto speak in 
terms of abuse in such circumstances is not always difficult to iden-
tiかHowever，if， for example， Mr Potts starts an action with no other 
purpose than to be a nuisance to his neighbour Mr Turvin， whom 
he hates， one can say that Potts is abusing his rights by exercising 
the correspondent legal action. Similarly， ifPotts resists an action 
29 Napier:フ‘AbuseofRight' etc， at271. 
30 ThIs view was first reaffirmed at the beginning of this century by Louis 
J osserand in De l'esprit des droits et de leur・relativite，below， 9 7.Some commentators， 
however， prefer to speak in (the equally teleological) terms of “detournement des 
droiぉdeleur fonction sociale" (for example， Ghestin et Goubeaux，ηαite de droit civil 
etc， at698-704). 
31 See also BetiョIstituzionidi dirito romαno， 1， Padova， 1967， c 79 
32 Winfield， 17ze Hist仰 ofConspir，仰 etc，and The Present Law of Abuse etc. 
(16) 
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with no other purpose than to be a nuisance to the plaintiff， he is 
abusing his rights by defending himself in that way.33 
In the stil blossoming law of the European Union reference 
to a 'general principle of abuse of rights' can be found both in the 
legislation/4 and in the reported cases.35 It is， however， largely a 
matter of national regulation the extent to which the possibility of 
abuse of rights is recognised， and condemned. 
Before 1 turn to such regulation， the brief observations which 
follow， are in order. 
6. In the matter of abuse of rights， the Civil Code of J apan is ex-
emplary. The substantial amendments introduced by law no. 222 of 
December 22， 1沙947九3FaS a C∞onsequence of the enactment 0ぱfthe1946 
Cons幻ti江tl以1託必tiぬor凡1し， made sure t出ha抗tthe ma坑t詑erof abuse of rights was adι 欄
dressed， and regula ted:‘No abusing of rights is permissible'-Article 
1(3). Although the provision in argument might primαfacie ap-
pear to be far too broad to be of any use， several qualifications are 
stil possible. One such qualification was suggested in 1965 by Mr 
Wagatsuma， according to whom Article 1(3) should be taken to 
refer only to instances whereby the "abusor" and the “abusee" are 
other thαηin a specific juridical relationship with one another-for 
Article 1(2) on good faith would control such remaining cases.37 This 
is， really， an outer limit to the J apanese notion of abuse of rights， 
that logically precedes and thus adds up to the subjective and ob-
jective requirements outlined above. Another qualification lies in 
3 But se A.G.む Sudeley(1896):‘人“rightof action" is not the power of 
bringing an action. Anybody can bring an action， though he has no right at all. 
The meaning of the phrase is that the person has a right or claim before the ac-
tion， which is determined by the action to be a valid right or claim' (per Esher 
MR). 
34 0.].1. 391，31-12-1992， at36. O.J.1. 225，20-8-1990， at10， refers back to 
the relevant French statute book. 
35 Reports of cases for the years 1990 (2367， at2376 par 7)， 1988 (6039， at
6058 c and d)， 1985 (363， at386 par 35). 
36 The Civil Code of Japan was enacted by law no. 89， April27， 1896. Law 
no. 222， December 22， 1947， reformed Book IV (“Relatives") and Book V (“Succes-
sion")， and added Article 1 and Article 1-2 to Book 1 (“General Provisions"). 
37 S. Wagatsuma， Civil Law (in J apanese)， 1， Tokyo， 1965， at38 f. 
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that the exercise of any given right can only be abusive when the 
values protected by it are much more limited than the values pro聞
記ctedby a countervailing right that the exercise of the first right 
is meant to affect (for example， public order). 
It seems to be established that the abusive exercise of one's own 
rights will normally prevent it from being effective.38 1n some cases， 
it appears that damages may be awarded to the abusee in conse幽
quence ofthe abusor's behaviour stigmatised as a civil wrong.39 Mes幽
sieurs Noda and Nomura extend the notion of abuse of rights to 
include the Civil Code provision of Article 834 on forfeiture of pか
rental poweζand maintain that， on occasion， abuse can be dealt 
with by removing the right abused by the original holder.40 
Table 1 below indicates the presence of robust litigation in 
Japan in post叩waryears between 1945 and 1995 on issues concern-
ing the relationship between public order， good faith， and abuse of 
rights. 1n particular， the total number of reported cases which in 
one way or another deal with abuse of rights is 2.831.41 Of those 
cases， 2.789 cases were decided after the end ofWorld War I， and 
2.788 cases were decided after the enactment of the amendments 
to the Japanese Civil Code operated by law no. 222， December 22， 
1947. 
1t is noticeable that ofa total of2.831 cases-Table 1 (i)-963 
concer・nedabuse of rights and good faith. Of such smaller group of 
cases， 956 were decided after the end ofWorld War I (and 955 were 
decided after the enactment of the 1947 amendments to the Civil 
Code). By contrast， ofthe mentioned 2.831 cases， 347 cases concerned 
abuse of rights and public order (a notion that， inJ apan， includes 
boni mores)， 338 cases of which were in fact decided between the 
end ofWorld War I， and today (no case on abuse of rights and public 
38 ChihふSaibansho，Osaka， October 28， 1ヲ67(HJ 512-63). Daishin'in， Oc-
tober 主1935.(MS XIV-1965). 
日 Daishin'in，March 3， 1919 (MR XXV-356). 
40 Noda and Nomura，‘eabus' etc， at296. 
41 This figure on the Japanese case law， aswell as the figures which follow， 
are based on information provided by the HanreトTaikeiData Base System (update 
October 13， 1995). However， the numbers provided in each case includεdecisions 
which mention only in passing the matter to which such numbers refer. 
( 18) 
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Table 1 
Japan (42) 
Note: Total reported civillaw cases decided in Japan after World War I 46.626 
Total reported civillaw cases after Law no. 222 46.595 
(i) General Fなureson public order， good faitlz， &abuse of riglzts 
public order good faith abuse of rights 
total reported cases 2.3]] 3.356 2.831 
total rd eWFoar teIdI) 四ses(decided after 
明'orl 1.922 3.286 2‘798 
total rep.o2r2t2e} d cases {decided afIer 
Law no.222) 1.922 3.285 2.788 
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Years undcr abuse of rights abuse of rfaigith ts abuse of r9i0g1hictsy & total of cases 
consideration (total) &good public on abuse of 
rights only 
1945-1950 10 (943) 2 7 
1ヲ50-1955 188 67 19 102 
1955-1960 322 103 27 192 
1960-1965 339 127 52 160 
1965-1970 302 89 48 137 
1970-1ヲ75 321 94 35 129 
1975-1980 340 121 46 173 
1980-1985 345 139 39 167 
1985-1990 354 123 42 189 
1990-1995 278 91 29 158 
42 The author註cknowledgeswith thanks the help offered by Professor Yugen 
Kudo (子~anzan じniversity) in ident均ingthe information contained in the Table 
43 The number in brakets refers to the cases on abuse of rights decided be-
tween the enactment ofLaw no. 222 and Dec. 31， 1949. 
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order was decided between the end of the War and the enactment 
of Law no. 222). So， cases discussing the relationship between abuse 
of rights situations and good faith situations were about three times 
出 orefrequent than those concerned with the relationship existing 
between abuse of rights situations and public order issues. 
Of the total number of reported cases dealing one way or an-
other with abuse of rights， 197 concerned the issue of the abusive 
exercise of rights in the context of a sale of immovables (including 
sales which， infact， are mortgages)， whereas 109 cases concerned the 
lease of such immovables.44 Finally， and significantlぉ15 1 cases dealt 
with abuse of rights within the context oflabour relationships.45 
(iii) The Impasse of the Civil Law 
7. It is arguable whether the Romans developed (at least， inpost-
classicallaw) the notion that the exercise of proprietary rights over 
things should have its limits. Some places in the Digest seem to 
suggest SO.46 For example， inD. 20 1 27 the following situation is 
depicted (italics are mine). 
MARCELLUS. Seruum， quem quis pignori dederat， ex leuis倫
sima offensa uinxit， mox soluit， etquia debito non satisfaciebat， credi鵬
tor minoris seruum uendidit: an aliqua actio creditori in debitorem 
constitutenda sit， quia crediti ipsius actio non suficit ad id quod deest 
presequendum? quid si eum interfecisset aut eluscasset? ubi quidem 
interfecisset， ade油ibendumtenetur: ubi autem eluscasset， quasi damni 
inuriae dabimus actionem ad quantum interest， quod debilitando aut 
uinciendo persecutionem pignoris exinanierit. fingamus nullam crediti 
nomine actionem esse， quia forte causa ceciderat:刀θnexistimo indignam 
4 The most recent， Supreme Court case was decided by Saiko-Saibansho 
(SS)， 1994， 20December (which decided that， inthe circumstances， noabuse of 
rights could be claimed to have taken place). 
45 For εxample， SS1993，1 June， which reversed both the District Court， 
and the Court of Appeal， decisions， and rejected the employee's defence on abuse 
of rights. 
46 D. 6， 1， 38;9，2ヲ29，1; 9，2，3ヲ， 1; 39， 1， 12.Buckland and h1cNair， Roman 
Law & Common Law etc， at96 f. 
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γ'em animaduersioneε1αuxilio preaetol‘is. ULPIANUS notat: Sl~ ut credi-
toηnocereらuinxit，tenebitur， simerentem， non tenebitur. 
So (according to the Pennsylvania edition)， 
MARCELLUS. The mortgagor of a slave chained him for a 
trivial offense， then unchained him. The debt was not paid and the 
creditor sold the slave for les. Should the credi10r be given an action 
against the deb1Or， asthe action on the loan does not suffice to en-
able him to recover the residue? Suppose the debtor 10 have killed 
him or put out his eye? If he killed him， he is liable in the action for 
production. If he put his eye out， we shall allow an action as if for 
wrongful damage to the extent that the weakening or chaining re-
duced the value of the action on mortgage. Imagine that because of 
a procedural error the action on the loan fails. 1 think the preator might 
welltαke noteαnd give a remed)人ULPIAN:He isliable ifhe chαined the 
slαve to haηη the creditoηnot if the slave deserved Il. 
The notion that examples such as the above one might amount 
to a Roman doctrine of abuse of rights， was opposed by the Italian 
Scjaloia-according to whom the doctrine was rather a product of 
the labour and interpretation of Glossators and Bartolists.47 Inter-
esting though this question might be from the historical point of 
view， the French， the Germans， and the Italians of today have their 
own doctrines on abuse48-although the import of such doctrines 
47 V. Scialoja， 'Aemulatio'， inStudi giuridici， II: Diriuo privato， Roma， 1932， at
216 f. 
48 Scholarly contribution to the matter of abuse of rights is massive if， however， 
somewhat scattered. For general as well as particular aspects of the matter (including 
the historical development of it)， see Gutteridge，‘Abuse of Rights' etc， at22 f; 
Ghestin et Goubeaux， 7i-aite de droit civil etc， at674-725 (with an excellent French 
bibliography at 675); ]acubezky，‘Zur Frage des allgemeinen Schikanenverbots'， in
Gruchot's Beitrage， 40， 1896， at591 f; Endemann， Lehrbuch des burgerlichen Rechts~， 
Berlin， 1903， 9 84， at424ヲno.18; Cosak und Mitteis， Lehrbuch des deutschen bur-
gerlichen Rechts8， ]ena， 1927， S 324， at318-320; Wieacker， Zur rechtstheorischen 
Prazisierung des S 242 BGB， Tubingen， 1956; Merz，‘Vom Schikaneverbot zum Rechts-
misbrauch'， inZeitschrift jur Rechtsvergleichung， 1977， at162 f; Palandt， BUI二
gerliches Gesetzbuch Beck'sche Kurz-Kommentai・e，54th edition， Munchen， 1995; Betti， 
Istituzioni di dirito romano， Padova， 1967， S 79; Natoli，λTote preliminari etc; Rotondi， 
‘I:abuso di dirito' etc; Cattaneo，‘Buona fede obbiettiva e abuso del dirito'， in
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in relation to other parts of the law varies considerably. It should 
be noticed， inparticular， that XVlIIth and (above al) XIXth centuηr 
ideologies-keen as they were to reaffirm the absolute centrality 
of property in the life of individuals-managed to circumscribe 
drastically the traditional， broader notion of abuse of proprietary 
rights over things. In that sense， one is not surprised that the 1804 
Code NapoZeon had no express provision on abuse of rights (whereas 
later Codes often would). Nevertheless， a famous 1855 decision by 
the French court of Colmar (concerning a chimney built with the 
sole purpose of being a nuisance to the neighborhood) is generally 
accepted to be the main precedent for today's commonly accepted 
notion that‘the exercise of a right which can be attributed only to 
a malicious motive is actionable'.49 
The French doctrine of abuse of rights received a decisive con-
tribution from the treatment given to it during the thirties by Louis 
Josserand in his celebrated book De L語学ηtdes droits et de leur relativite. 
In it， Josserand divided al problematic juridical acts in illegal向ctes
illegaux)， negligent (actesfautift)， and excessive (actes excesift). In the 
first case， 'ZepZaideur ou Ze saisissant a d令部seles limites objectives de 
son droit' (plaintiff or defendant have defied the objective bounda-
ries of their rights). In the second case (in which Josserand includes 
the abusive exercise of rights)， the acts 'ont eteαccomplis dans les 
termes de la loi， C01ザorm的 enta laregle du jeu， mais dans un eψrit qui 
がestpoint celui de l'istitution' (conduct is lawful， and respectful of the 
rules of the game， but not consistent with the spirit of the institu-
tion). Finally， inthe case of excessive rights， the acts are those ζquz， 
αccomplis d，αns les limites objectives tmcees pαr laloi et pour des riαlsons 
uαlables， causent cependant a un tiers un prejudices qu'il semit injuste 
de luifaire supporter definitivement' (conduct is lawful， and dictated 
by valid reasons， though it causes to third parties a prejudice that 
it would be unfair for them to suffer)フandso may give rise to strict 
Riv.trim.duψroc.CI'むリ 1971，614f; Dias and Markesinis，η!ze English Law 01 Torts 
etc， at110. 
4雪 FH. Lawson， Negligence in the Civil Law， Oxford， Clarendon， at16-17 
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liability for their author ("responsabilite objective勺.50Moving from 
such tripartition， Josserand explained how any other act which does 
not fal within itコcanbe regarded as “normal". In that sense， Jos-
serand said， proprietaηT rights should be described as egoistical， 
and abuse should be inferred whenever the egoistical spirit of such 
rights cannot be demonstrated. 
Today in France Josserand's theory seems to be kept somewhat 
on hold (at least， inits original terms). In order to solve abuse-of-
rights-situations， French courts appear often to rely on (the generic) 
notions of equity and 'politique juridique'， but also on Article 1382 
of the Code Civiι-and thus treat abuse-of-rights-situations as a par同
ticular instance of the (equally generic) notion offaute. This of course 
generates distress among legal scholars-though， inturn， such dis“ 
tress is itself at times expressed in a somewhat circular way.51 This 
uncharacteristic lack of direction on the part of the French judicト
ary and scholarship constitutes (1 think) some evidence towards the 
proposition that even the highly developed European legal systems 
generate voids which are alarming， and cannot be ignored. The impαse 
in the matter of abuse of rights， howeverフdoesnot detract from the 
fact that-nowadays句均一.itwould appear that there exists a large con-
sensus as to the proposition that al rights (even proprietary rights) 
must have their limits-and this， ofcourse， isthe central proposi-
tion of Josserand's stil valid legacy. 
8. Josserand's theory had a certain influence in Europe， and its 
tenets were widely discussed throughout. 
50 L. Josserand， De l'esprit des droits e de leur relativite， Paris， 1927， at84-
85. 
51 H. L. M.azeaud et主mc，7子αitede la respons，αbilite civile， 1， no. 564 f; Colin 
et Capitant， Trαite de droit civile， I(8me ed)ヲno.195. According with Ghestin and 
Goubeaux， Fmite de droit civil etc， at692-694，‘[I]a faute dans I'exercise des droits 
comme critとredes abus est une theorie soit inexacte soit presque totalement inu-
tile' though ‘[s]i . . . on admet que le terme "abus dεdroit" designe une limita-
tion particuliとredu droit， il est cJair que celui qui “abuse" ainsi de son droit agit 
en realite sans droit et engage sa responsabilite. La sanction de I'acte abusif trouve 
bien un fondement dans l'articJe l382 du Code CiviJ. Mais il falu prealablement 
faire tomber la presomption de liceite de I'acte en d己montrantl'abus， cequi permet 
de faire apparaitre la faute'. 
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One interesting objection to such theory soon developed that 
'it is seldom that a man injures another out of pure spite， incircum叩
stances where he himself stands to obtain no tangible benefit from 
his act'.52 This objection is， 1 think， open to doubt. The somewhat 
disturbing case concerning someone who in Germany prevented his 
children from entering a property where their mother was buried，53 
or an equally famous case where the same claim had been put be-
fore 74 different courts，54 show that abuse of rights for other than 
traditional economic reasons is only too real戸True，S 226 of the Bur-
gerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) according to which '[t]he exercise of a right 
is unlawful， ifits purpose can only be to cause damage to another 
person' (so called Schikaneverbot)ョwasnever employed by the Gerω 
man courts with enthusiasm. However， it does not follow that this 
was due to the fact that the events contemplated by S 226 do not 
occur， orare infrequent. 
One explanation for the German antipathy for S 226 is that it 
may be difficu1t to prove that the abusive behaviour did not have a 
purpose other than to cause damage to someone else. Another ex“ 
planation is that the particular event under scrutiny is best seen 
to fal within the domain of a different provision. So， againラ the
German Code contains two paragraphs that can be usefully resorted 
to in a number of relevant circumstances. According to BGB S 826 
(Sittenwidrigkeit )，‘[a] person who wilfully causes damage to another 
in a manner contra可 tomorality is bound to compensate the other 
for damage'. That is， anyone exercising her rights contra bonos mo-
res shall be liable. Some qualifications would stil need to obtain. 
So， for example， the standard of morality required should be iden-
tified by reference to the standard held by a fair and reasonable peト
son; the exercise of the right in question should be directed towards 
a specific person; and the damage must be intentionalフorat least 
52 Lawson， Negligence etc， at17. 
53 Reichsgerichtsentscheidung in Zivilsachen (RGZ) 72， 351. 
54 Arbeitsgericht Hamm 66， 272. 
5 In such situations， it would seem that there is no‘tangible benefit' aひ
cruing to the abusor一時ifthere is one， than there would be probably a“benefit" 
not recognised (nor recognisable) by the legal system. 
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tolerated by the abusor. Yet， having such provision， there might be 
no need to resort to S 226. 
Likewise， and more importantlぉBGBS 242 (11・euund Glαu-
ben) provides that‘[t]he debtor is bound to effect performance ac姐
cording to the requirements of good faith， giving consideration to 
common usage'. Accordingly， it was held that the exercise of a right 
against the requirements of good faith gives rise to an instance of 
"excess of right" and， assuch， isunlawfu1.56 This， inturn， was ex-
tended to include virtually any instance of abuse of rights-lik。
for example， the case where a person who takes part in a danger欄
ous sport (inc1uding football) is injured and then c1aims damages 
despite the fact that he was injured by someone who was playing 
according to the rules.57 Again， certain qualifications must obtain 
for S 242 to apply. One is that the abused interest should be pro欄
tected by statute and by the Constitution. So， general principles of 
equity (al訟emeineBilligkeitserwagungen) would not do-for to pro“ 
tect them against another person's right would impair constitu-
tional principles.58 A further qualification for S 242 to apply is that 
there剖 ustbe a specific legal relationship between the abusor and 
the abusee (on-going business， contractual negotiations， contract， 
etc).59 Howeveむthepoint is that whenever such circumstances ob-
tainフthedirections contained in BGB S 242 somewhat pre-empt 
those contained in BGB S 226， and thus regulate events which oth幽
erwise would easily fall within the common description of abuse 
of righ ts. This isフhoweverフnotalways so， nor does it mean that 
abuse of rights is rareフorthat its existence is of no concern for the 
German. 
9. Under the Italian law， regulated instances of abuse of rights are 
'ati di emulazione' and ζlite temerariゲ'.60The first case is contemplated 
56 Bundesgerichtsentscheidung in Zivilsachen (BGHZ) 12，157. 
57 BGHZ 63，145. 
58 Article 20 II and 97 1. 
59 Interestingly enough， a void contract would do (BGHZ 85， 48) 
60 On abuse of rights under the Italian law， seTabuso di dirito e il fenomeno 
dell'adeguamento dela norma ala coscienza coletiva'， inλTuovi studi di vario diηtlO'， 
(25) 
171 
by Article 833 of the 1942 Codice Civile， according to which the 
owner (proprなtano)is asked to abstain from acting in a w♀y that is 
intended to have no other purpose than to damage or irritate another 
person. But the Italian notion of damage is a fairly broad one. The 
second case is contemplated by Article 96 of the Codice di procedura 
civile， according to which damages (in addition to costs) can be 
awarded upon request of the winning party， orby the judge exω 
oficio， whenever it turns out that the losing party brought or op-
posed a legal action in bad faith. Beyond that， the ltalian Civil Code 
does not include a general provision prohibiting abuse of rights in 
so many words.“However， Article 2043 of the Code contains a gen-
eral provision making any person causing problems to another person 
liable for damages. Furthermore， Article 1175 instructs that debtor 
and creditor must act 'secondo corァettezz，α"and Articles 1337， 1358， 
1366， 1375， 1460(2)， and 2598 n. 3， require good faith behaviour (buonα 
fede) in a number of crucial circumstances (negotiations， contract 
interpretation， etc). Accordingly， the contemporary doctrinal debate 
seems to be focused (like in Germany) on the notion of good faith 
(buonαfede)， and on its boundaries with the notion of abuse of rights.62 
In particular， it is objected that one thing is that the exercise of rights 
must have limits suggested by social issues (this would be the domain 
of a doctrine of abuse of rights)， and a different thing is the matter 
of the relationship among different rights (which would be instead the 
concern of the various provisions on good faith).63 Also， the posi舗
tivistic observation that the expression “abuse of rights" is intrin幽
sically a non-sequitur， is challenged by some authors with the remark 
th訂 theevents in argument are normally such that itαeppeαrs to 
Padova， 1978， at377-383;じ.Natoli， '子~otepreliminari ad una teoria deU'abuso del 
dirito nelI'ordinamento giuridico italiano'， inRiv.trim. e dir. e proc.ciむ， Milano， 
1958， at18-37. 
61 But Natoli，‘Note preliminari' etc， at19， note (5)， mentions other in仲
stances in the Civil Code that ¥'arious Italian authors believe to amount to abuse 
of rights. 
62 G. Cattaneo，‘Buona fede obbiettiva e abuso del dirito'， inRiむ.trim.dir
e proc.civ.， 1971， at613-658. 
63 Cattaneo，‘Buona fede' etc， at636. 
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the external world that the agent is， infact， doing nothing else than 
exercising her right in the lawful way. Therefore-it is concluded-
the expression “abuse of rights" can be well justified by the ambi-
guity ofthe circumstances regulated under such labe1.64 
Such being the ltalian background to the matter that is here 
of concern， it is clear that the conclusions are not dissimilar from 
those discussed with reference to the German experience. So， equally， 
the problems remain. They can be summarised as follows: (a) the 
abusive exercise of proprietary rights occurs， and it occurs more 
frequently than it is claimed by certain literature; (b) when the two 
parties are in some kind of contractualフpre明contractual，or quasi“ 
contractual relationship， a general provision requiring good faith 
should normally deter either of them from exercising their rights 
in an abusive way (whether this happens or not is an entirely diι 
ferent matter); (c) if， on the other handフtheabusive behaviour causes 
actual damage， a further provision (Article 2043 of the Civil Code) 
may see that damages are awarded (but al sorts of conditions would 
need to obtain for this provision to operate); (d) other than that， 
the exercise of proprietary rights which is only intended to dam幽
ageフisexpressly acknowledged (and rejected) either specifically as 
abusive， orgenerally as immoral. 
(iv) The Positivism of the Common Law 
10. When it cornes to the Common Law (andフinparticular， the 
English law)， the traditional treatment of the matter of abuse of 
rights turns out to be rather simple. In fact， it seems to be gener-
ally accepted that the English do not recognise a general principle 
rejecting the abusive exercise of one's own rights.65 The decision 
in The MayoちAldemlenand Burgesses of the Borough of Bradford v Ed-
ωαγd Pickles (1895) has been continuously referred to in any and each 
64 Natoli，‘Note preliminari' etc， at37 
65 Napier，‘Abus芯ofrights' etc; Dias and Markesinis ， η~le English Law 01 
Torts ctc， at110. But this seems to be true of abuse of proprietary rights only-
Buckland and McNair， Roman Law & Common Lawεtc， at99. 
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subsequent case on abuse of proprietary rights decided in England 
ever since，6 as well as in cases concerning abuse of rights outside the 
law of property.67 
Because the position held by the English appears to be so firmly 
established，I shall not expand upon it. The only point 1 wish to make 
here is that， despite the apparent positivism of the Common Law， 
a series of reputedly independent judicial doctrines and legal mecha“ 
nisms have indeed dealt in the English law with abuse of rights situa幽
tions-forming a C01pUS that of a general principle of abuse of rights 
lacks only the name. Accordingl弘1should take this occasion to foト
mulate a suggestion resulting from recent research 1 have been doing 
at the University of Oxford-whichフ1hope， proves the point. 
11. In 1989 a difficult Reform was m昌dein England concerning land 
contracts.68 One aspect of this Reform was the perceived “abolition" 
of the equitable doctrine of part幽performance.品9Elsewhere 1 have 
demonstrated that the doctrine of part幽performancewas first de-
vised by the Lord Nottingham in 1681 in the decision now known 
as Potts v Turvin.70 The doctrine has travelled throughout the cen-
turies， then come to this century， and survived-in a somewhat mod幽
ernised form-until 1989. My suggestion is that the doctrine was 
actually a veηT important instance whereby the English legal sys-
tem acknowledged， and rejected， the abusive exercise of proprie-
taηT rights by the defendant. 
66 For example， Chapmanむ Honig(1963)， regarding the lawful termina-
tion of a tenancy by the landlord. 
67 AllenむFlood(1898)， regarding the lawful termination ofthe employment 
contract of several workers. 
68 Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989. 
69 So， G.H. Treitel，ηeLαωofContract (9th ed， 195)， at171， repeats with 
the Law Commission (Law Comm 164， at16) that‘there can be no part-performance 
of a non-existent contract'. Els巴where，Ihave argued that (despite opinions to the 
contrary) the doctrine of part-performance was never formally abolished， and could 
wel be resorted to by the courts if need come (se my doctoral thesis entitled 
Form in Contract Laω: ASilent Revolution， Oxford 195). 
70 See U-I A Stramignoni， 'Atthe Dawn of Part♂'erformance: A Hypothe-
sis'， inJournal of Legal History， forthcoming (August 196). 
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12. It al began in 1677 when the Statute ofFrauds and Perjuries was 
enacted.71 According with section 4， certain contracts (among which 
land contracts) should now be made in writing， and signed by the 
party to be charged.72 It is important to notice that section 4 had 
been devised to protect meritorious defendants against fraudulent 
plaintiffs claiming that a contract (or certain terms thereof) had 
been made-when， infact， no contract (or different terms) had been 
made. Those were verγdifficult times in England， and such fraudゃ
lent claims were al but infrequent. The uncertain state of the law 
of procedure did not help. 
Almost immediately after section 4 was enacted， a different 
problem arose. Now defendants could (and would) claim that no 
contract had been made whenever the required formalities had not 
been met. If no contract had actually been made， that was fine. The 
pleading of the Statute of Fraud would simply have the effect to 
signify the defendant's intention to paralyse the plaintiff's request 
that a (non-existent) contract should be enforced. If， by contrast， a 
contract had been made， fraudulent defendants could now get away 
with it simply by pleading the Statute of Frauds， and therefore void-
1ηg the (existing) transaction. This， ofcourseフcouldnot be tolerated 
by the legal system-noしatleast， if(in the meantime) the plain-
ti百hadbeen acting detrimentally in performance of， orreliance on， 
the (now voided) contract. 
In its original version， the doctrine of part performance al“ 
lowed the meritor・iousplaintiff to obtain from the Chancellor an 
order for the specific performance of certain contracts despite the 
fact that the required formalities had not been complied with by the 
parties. This result could be reached only if certain conditions were 
specifically met. Here 1 shall only mention that the main condition 
71 An extensive treatment of this can be found in Stramignoni， Form in COIト
tract Lαw etc， ch1. 
72 Such were contracts by executor or administrator to answer damages out 
of his own estate; contracts to answer for the debt， default or miscarriages of an-
other person; contracts made upon consideration of marriage; contracts for the sale 
of land or any interest in land; contracts not to be performed within one year from 
stipulation 
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was that， inthe circumstances， defendant should be found to be acト
ing fraudulently. 
So far， litle has been said by the concerned legal scholarship 
as to what the defendant's fraud would amount to. My suggestion 
is that the defendant's fraud was in the nature of the unlawful exer-
cise ofhis right (the English perhaps would rather cal it “power") to 
“defend" himself by pleading the Statute of Frauds. In circumstances 
where plaintiff had acted detrimentally in performance of， orreli-
ance on， the contract in question， the Chancellor would regard as 
unlawful to permit the defendant to exercise his right to plead the 
Statute of Frauds， and thus get away with that. There was a case of 
abuse of rights whose characteristics were perhaps in part differ聞
ent from the official doctrine of abuse as it developed during the 
XVlIIth and XIXth centuries. Stil， innuce that was it-a regulated 
instance of unlawful exercIse of one's own proprietary rights which， 
however， in1989 the U.K. Parliament decided to“abolish".7 
13. Was it wise to "abolish" the doctrine of part performance? 
A proper answer to this question would require much discus-
sion that 1 am not allowed to undertake here. However， asa con“ 
clusive remark in the present introduction to the matter of abuse 
of rights in England， 1shall observe the following. 
The English are said to have no recognised general principle of 
good faith. Nor are said to have a recognised general principle like 
Article 1382 of the Code Civil， S 226 or S 826 of the BGB， orArticle 
2043 of the ltalian Codice Civile. They haveフhoweveζjudicial doc幽
trines and other legal mechanisms such as the doctrine of part per“ 
formance. Such doctrine， inmy view， dealt with a particular in-
stance of abuse of rights-despite the fact that it was not in itself a 
general statement about abuse of rights. A1so， after Steadmαn v Steadω 
mαn，74 the doctrine of part performance was finally given a modern 
shape， and thus the limitations placed by XVIIIth and XIXth centuries 
laisez.てfaireideologies were， inthe event， substantially reduced. The 
73 1.bove， note 69. 
74 C1. [1973] 31.1 ER 977， [1974] QB 161; HL [1974] 21.1 ER 977. 
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Japanese data offered above confirm that even in reputedly advanced 
societies abuse of rights occurs more often than it is usually believed. 
1t might be therefore worth reconsidering the function of the doctrine 
of part-performance under this light. 
(v) Conclusions 
14. European countries rely on certain propositions that forrn what 
they then cal the "legal systern". Such propositions are forrnally 
identified， forrnally applied， and forrnally disposed of. The corn幽
血 O九liberalbelief is that a certain degree of forrnality in the iden“ 
tification， application， and disposal of such propositions insures a 
degree of certainty that， inturn， insures a degree of equality that， in
turn， insures a degree of justice-that is found to be al in al satis幽
factory. Critics attack forrnality as intrinsically evil as-they say-
it bars the path to justice. 1t seerns to rne that neither position is ac-
ceptable. The forrner thesis accepts that forrnal rules provide an ex-
clusionary reason for the judiciary not to look at occasional issues 
clashing with the rule they apply， and delegates the responsibility 
of devising new rules to the political authority if and when such 
authority is willing and ready to intervene in each particular case. 
The latter thesis rejects forrnality altogetherフanddirects the judi“ 
C1呂町 tosearch for the substantive issues at stake as they present 
thernselves-without any further delay noむforthat rnatter， any fear 
(or alrnost any fear) of "discretionary disasters". 
It seerns to rne that forrnality is an essential feature of the Euroゅ
pean philosophical and legal heritage. !f，however， forrnality is thus 
in rny view largely inescapable， that is not to say that forrnality is 
either good or bad-indeed， forrnality seerns to be a fundarnentally 
neutral entity. Forrnality sirnply rneans that legal analysis rnust start 
at an ear1ier stage， and that-in theory-it would be for the legis-
lator to consider whether each of the rules in question rnay on occa-
sion produce hardship. While， 1 think， it could be reasonably ex-
pected that al rules will cause hardship whenever the reasons for 
which they were initially devised do not obtainうthisof course de 
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facto could only be verified at the (later) time of litigation (legislators 
are statesmen-hardly oracles). On the other hand， it might be felt 
that it should not be left simply to the mere discretion of each court 
to devise in each particular case an answer to that case. Accordingly， 
a modern version of the traditional doctrine of abuse of rights could 
perhaps provide an appropriate， pre-determined instrument to meas“ 
ure in each of the actual circumstances whether， ornot， the right 
in question was exercised for the reasons for which such right was 
initially conferred to the relevant body. 
Both the Civillaw and the Common law seem to have rejected 
the traditional notion of αbus de droit. But so far neither the Civil 
law nor the Common law seem to have been able to point to a coル
vincing alternative. Abuse of rights situations do occuむandneed 
to be dealt with in a cogent and consistent way. To this problem， 
howeveζthere appears to be no easy answeιOne possibility to 
overcome the traditional criticism against the doctrine of abus de 
droit (whereby typically abuse comes up as a defence in an action 
bythe “abusor") is perhaps to analyse abuse of rights situations in 
terms of "benefit removed from" rather than“harm inf1icted to" 
the defendant.75 In other words， one could think of abuse of rights 
situations as instances concerning some law_向1behaviour (by the plaiル
tijf) leading to the unjustifiable (or unjustified) removal of a well d，そfined
benefit 斤omthe dφndant. So， the plaintiff's conduct must be in幽
tentional， lawful， and such that a certain benefit for the defendant 
would be removed. In such view， there would be no need to show 
the αctual reαsons for the plaintiff's (intentional) conduct-least of 
al ‘the intention to cause harm'. The benefit for the defendant (which 
would be removed)， by contrasしwouldhave to be substantial enough 
to be measurable in economic terms. Finallうら there would be "abuse" 
(but perhaps a more felicitous name for such doctrine would have 
to be found) whenever the conduct by the plaintiffwould not ge任
erate an advantage (found by the court to be) substantial enough 
75 While perhaps one could say that every time some kind of harm is inf1icted 
on someone some kind of benefit is removed from the victim， not every time that 
a benefit is removed from someone this can be said to have been harmed. 
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to be measured in economic terms， or(if so measurable) then one 
that could be (by the court) hardly compared in consequence with the 
benefit removed. In the specific case of property rights， this would be 
justified by the fact that stil to this day such rights seem to be per-
ceived as (mainly) patrimonial rights. The moment such rights are 
exercised in a way that cannot be convincingly showed to have an ex-
planation measurable in economic terms， it would seem that the body 
to whom such rights were initially conferred can be asked to restrain 
from further exercise of those rights in that particular way. 
15. This， againフisby no means a final proposal. Rather， there is an 
initial attempt to invite fresh debate on an undeniably difficult mat値
目工 Theprize， ofcourse， would be a more convincing and (because 
of the consequent abatement of unjustified or unjustifiable claims) a 
more effective legal system-something tha t， 1 think， would be no 
doubt worth the effort. 
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